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Abstract
We investigate the stable sets of social conict games by employing
the framework of the (abstract) system by Greenberg (Theory of So-
cial Situations: An Alternative Game theoretic Approach, Cambridge
University Press, 1990). The social conict game includes the pris-
oners' dilemma and the chicken game. We show that the stable set
may fails to exist in the system directly derived from the social con-
ict game. The stable set exists if and only if the strong equilibrium
exists in the underlying game. We consider another system where an
agent is prepared and each player is allowed to delegate his decision
to the agent. Then, the stable set always exists and consists of Pareto
ecient outcomes with a certain property. We also discuss the re-
lationship between the strong equilibrium and the stable set for the
model with delegations.
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1 Introduction
Game theory well treats situations where individual interests conict with the
social interest completely (the prisoners' dilemma) or partially (the chicken
game). In such a game, each player has two strategies, cooperation and de-
fection, and there is usually an insucient number of cooperating players for
the eciency at the Nash equilibrium. We will refer to the games describ-
ing such conicting situations as social conict games. Examples include the
public good provision game with binary choices (Taylor and Ward, 1982) and
the game of voluntary participation in a public good provision mechanism
(Saijo and Yamato, 1999).
In line with the usual ineciency of the Nash equilibrium, the Nash equi-
librium is usually unstable against coalitional deviations; the grand coalition
can deviate from a Nash equilibrium unless the Nash equilibrium is ecient.
Indeed, a strong equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) exists if and only if the Nash
equilibrium is ecient in the games with social conicts. The coalition-proof
equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1989) is a relaxed concept that requires the
deviating coalition to be credible. The coalition-proof equilibria in the vol-
untary participation game was characterized by Shinohara (2010). However,
the ineciency of the equilibrium remains unchanged.
We consider the stable set for a strategic game by applying the theory of
social situations by Greenberg (1990). Specically, we employ the (abstract)
system and its stable set. The relationship between the set of the strong
equilibrium and the stable set is just like that between the core and the
stable set for the coalitional game. In the theory of social situations, the
stable set is regarded as a recommendation of an acceptable course of action.
However, we will show that the stable set may not exist. Therefore, no
recommendation is acceptable for the players in such a situation.
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Several studies have approached the stable set for the social conict
game by applying the theory of social situations, especially in the prisoners'
dilemma. Nakanishi (2001) considered the stable set when only individual
deviations are allowed. He showed that the stable set exists and contains at
least one ecient strategy prole. Suzuki and Muto (2005) considered the
farsighted stable set by Chwe (1994), allowing coalitional deviations. They
showed that any singleton consisting of an ecient and individually rational
strategy prole is always a farsighted stable set. Further, Nakanishi (2009)
considered the farsighted stable sets where only individual deviations are al-
lowed. These studies imposed some requirements on the ability of the players.
Nakanishi (2001, 2009) restricted the players from forming a coalition, and
Suzuki and Muto (2005) and Nakanishi (2009) required the players to be
fully farsighted.
This paper takes another approach to the stable set for social conict
games by exogenously giving the players the option to delegate. Specically,
we consider a model with a (non-player) agent, to whom each player can
choose to delegate his decision or not, such as an international or intrana-
tional arbitration organization, a national or local government, or a lawyer.
Each player has the option to delegate his decision to the agent or not, and
the agent, who is common to all the players, acts on behalf of all the dele-
gating players.
The idea of delegation is traced back to Schelling (1960): a player may
be beneted by delegating his decision to the agent (who may or may not
be a player), who has a dierent interest from the delegating player. In this
paper, each player is, of course, interested in his own payo only, while the
agent is uniformly interested in the payos of all the delegating players. Then,
delegation plays the role of a commitment device in the sense that delegating
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players must give up their decision to change their strategies selshly. The
role of the agent here diers from that in Okada (1993), who also considered
the prisoners' dilemma model with an agent. In his model, the agent plays
as a punishment device fo force the players to abide by the agreement in an
endogenously arranged institution.
To make the delegation an eective commitment device, we will assume
that each player cannot withdraw his delegation once he has delegated his
decision. However, the players are completely free to decide whether or not
to delegate; they are never forced. Therefore, the stable set recommends an
acceptable course of action for the players that includes whether they should
delegate their decision or not.
This paper shows that the stable set uniquely exists in the model with del-
egations and consists of ecient outcomes that include some outcomes where
no player delegates his decision. In this sense, we can recommend an accept-
able course of action in a social conict by arranging an agent exogenously.
This contrasts with the model without delegations where the stable set does
not to exist i the Nash equilibria are not strong equilibria. On the other
hand, some outcomes with full cooperation, (these are sometimes regarded as
\best" outcomes) are usually excluded from the stable set. Therefore, when
players are not forced to delegate their decision, full cooperation may not be
acceptable to the players. We also investigate the relationship between the
strong equilibrium and the stable set in the model with delegations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briey
introduce the (abstract) system and the stable set. In Section 3, we dene
the social conict game. We derive a system from the social conict game and
investigate the stable set in Section 4. In Section 5, we derive another system
by incorporating delegations. We also state and prove the unique existence
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and the characterization of the stable set for this system. In Section 6, we
conclude with some remarks.
2 The (abstract) system and the stable set
This section briey introduces the (abstract) system and the stable set for
the system by Greenberg (1990).
A system is a pair (A;), where A is a nonempty set and  is a binary
relation on A. The set A is called an outcome set, and the binary relation
 is called the dominance relation. For each x; y 2 A, x  y means that x
dominates y.
The stable set for the system is dened as follows, which is a direct
application of the original one by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944).
Denition 1 Let (A;) be a system. A subset K of A is a stable set for
(A;) i K satises the following two stabilities.
Internal stability: For any x; y 2 K, it is not true that x  y.
External stability: For any x 2 A nK, y  x for some y 2 K.
3 The social conict game
We consider a strategic game   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N), where N = f1; :::; ng
is the set of players, Xi is the set of strategies of i 2 N , and ui is the payo
function of i 2 N . Let N = fS  N j S 6= ;g be the set of coalitions. We
denote XS = i2SXi for all S 2 N and X = XN for simplicity. A strategy
prole x 2 X is (weakly Pareto) ecient i there exists no y 2 X such that
ui(y) > ui(x) for all i 2 N .
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We say   is a (symmetric) social conict game if Xi = fC;Dg for all
i 2 N and there exists some f : fC;Dg  f0; :::; n  1g ! R such that
ui(x) =
(
f(C; jC(x)j   1) if xi = C;
f(D; jC(x)j) if xi = D
for all i 2 N and x 2 X, where C(x) = fi 2 N j xi = Cg and f satises
Assumption 1 below.
Assumption 1 (a) f(C; h) and f(D; h) are increasing in h = 0; :::; n  1;
(b) There exists some h^ = 0; :::; n   1 such that f(C; h0) < f(D; h0) for all
h0  h^ and f(C; h00) > f(D; h00) for all h00 < h^;
(c) f(C; n  1) > f(D; 0).
(d) for all (a; h); (a0; h0) 2 fC;Dg  f0; :::; n   1g, (a; h) 6= (a0; h0) implies
f(a; h) 6= f(a0; h0).
In Assumption 1, (a) requires cooperation to benet other players, (b) as-
sumes the existence of a threshold, (c) assures the eciency of full cooper-
ation, and (d) is for simplicity. Note that (b) excludes the case where C is
the dominant strategy for all players, which is less interesting.
In addition to h^, we dene another threshold. Let h = 0; :::; n  1 be the
minimum integer such that f(D; h) > f(C; n  1). Note that the existence
and positivity of h are assured by Assumption 1(b) and (c). Note also
that h^  h; otherwise, f(C; h) > f(D; h) > f(C; n   1) > f(C; h), a
contradiction.
We introduce some notations. Given x 2 X, j 2 N , and S 2 N , we
denote xS = (xi)i2S, x S = xNnS, and x j = (xi)i6=j. Given S 2 N , CS
denotes xS such that xi = C for all i 2 S, and DS denotes xS such that
xi = D for all i 2 S.
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4 The social conict system
Let   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N) be a social conict game. The outcome set is
dened by X, the set of strategy proles. Given x; y 2 X and S 2 N , we
say y is inducible from x via S, denoted by x!S y, i xNnS = yNnS; we say
y dominates x via S, denoted by y S x, i x !S y and ui(y) > ui(x) for
all i 2 S. Given x; y 2 X, we simply say y is inducible from x, denoted by
x! y, i x!S y for some S 2 N ; we simply say y dominates x, denoted by
y  x, i y S x for some S 2 N . We say (X;) is a social conict system
(derived from  ).
The Nash and strong equilibria were originally dened in strategic games.
These concepts can be applied to the system (X;): x 2 X is a Nash
equilibrium i there exists no y 2 X and i 2 N such that y fig x; x 2 X is
a strong equilibrium i there exists no y 2 X and S 2 N such that y S x.
The social conict system can be regarded as an open negotiation in the
social conict game allowing coalitional deviations. Indeed, it is essentially
the same as the coalitional contingent threat situation in the theory of so-
cial situations (Greenberg, 1990, Chapter 7). Once an outcome (strategy
prole) is proposed, a coalition may declare that the members will change
their strategies if the players outside the coalition will stick to the proposed
strategies. At the revised outcome, some coalition may declare its intention
to change strategies if the players outside the coalition stick to the current
strategies, and so on.
For later analysis, we conrm the following fundamental properties.
Lemma 1 (a) x 2 X is a Nash equilibrium if and only if jC(x)j = h^.
(b) A Nash equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium if and only if h^ = h.
(c) x 2 X is ecient if and only if jC(x)j  h.
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Proof. (a) Straightforward.
(b) Assume that h^ = h. Fix an arbitrary Nash equilibrium x. By (a),
jC(x)j = h^ = h. Fix arbitrary T 2 N and yT 2 XT with yi 6= xi for all
i 2 T . First, assume that yi = D for all i 2 T . Since x is a Nash equilibrium
and by Assumption 1(a), ui(x) > ui(D; x i)  ui(yT ; x T ) for all i 2 T .
Thus, (yT ; x T ) is false. Assume next that there exists some j 2 T with
yj = C. Note that xj = D. Since x is a Nash equilibrium and h^ = h
,
uj(x) = f(D; h^) > f(C; n  1)  f(C; jC(yT ; x T )j   1) = uj(yT ; x T ):
Thus, (yT ; x T ) is again false. Hence x is a strong equilibrium.
Assume that h^ < h. Let z 2 X be a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 1(a),
jC(z)j = h^. By h^ < h and Assumption 1(a), ui(CN) > ui(z) for all i 2 N .
Hence z is not a strong equilibrium.
(c) Let x 2 X. First, assume that x is ecient. If jC(x)j < h, then
ui(CN) > ui(x) for all i 2 N since f(C; jC(x)j 1) < f(C; n 1) by Assump-
tion 1(a) and f(D; jC(x)j) < f(C; n   1) by jC(x)j < h, contradicting the
eciency of x. Hence f(D; jC(x)j) > f(C; n  1).
Next, assume that jC(x)j  h. Note that jC(x)j  h  h^. Fix an
arbitrary y 2 X. Assume that there exists some j 2 C(y) n C(x). Then,
uj(x) = f(D; jC(x)j) > f(C; n 1)  f(C; jC(y)j 1) = uj(y). Thus, y N x
is false. Therefore, assume C(y)  C(y). Then, ui(y) = f(C; jC(y)j   1) 
f(C; jC(x)j 1) = ui(x) for all i 2 C(y). Thus, y N x is again false. Hence,
x is ecient. 
In the social conict system, the stable set fails to exist in general. For-
mally, the stable set exists if and only if a strong equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 In the social conict system (X;), the stable set exists if
and only if h^ = h. If h^ = h, then fx 2 Xj jC(x)j = h^g is the unique stable
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set.
Proof. Let (X;) be the social conict system. First, assume that h^ = h.
Dene K = fx 2 Xj jC(x)j = h^g. By Lemma 1(a) and (b), K is the set of
strong equilibria. Therefore, K is internally stable.
Fix an arbitrary x =2 K. Suppose that jC(x)j > h^. Let x 2 X be such
that C(x)  C(x) and jC(x)j = h^. By the choice of x, x !C(x)nC(x) x.
By h^ = h, ui(x) = f(D; h^) > f(C; n  1)  f(C; jC(x)j   1) = ui(x) for all
i 2 C(x) n C(x). Thus, x C(x)nC(x) x.
Suppose that jC(x)j < h^. Let y 2 X be such that C(x)  C(y)
and jC(y)j = h^. By the choice of y, x !C(y)nC(x) y. By the denition
of h^, ui(y
) = f(C; h^   1) > f(D; h^   1)  f(D; jC(x)j) = ui(x) for all
i 2 C(y) n C(x). Thus, y C(y)nC(x) x. Hence, K is externally stable.
We turn to the uniqueness. Let K 0  X with K 0 6= K. Assume that
K nK 0 6= ;. Let x 2 K nK 0. Since x is a strong equilibrium by Lemma 1(b),
there exists no x0 2 K 0 such that x0  x. Thus, K 0 is not externally stable.
Therefore, assume that K nK 0 = ;. By K 0 6= K, there exists some y 2 K 0
such that y =2 K. Therefore, there exists some y0 2 K such that y0  y by
the external stability of K. Since K  K 0 by K nK 0 = ;, K 0 is not internally
stable. Hence, there exists no stable set other than K.
Next, assume that h^ < h. Suppose that there exists a stable set K.
Claim 1 For any x; y 2 X with C(x) ( C(y), either x  y or y  x.
Proof of Claim 1. Let x; y 2 X such that C(x) ( C(y). By C(x) (
C(y), both x !C(y)nC(x) y and y !C(y)nC(x) x. By Assumption 1(d), either
f(C; jC(y)j   1) > f(D; jC(x)j) or f(C; jC(y)j   1) < f(D; jC(x)j). In the
former case, y C(y)nC(x) x. In the latter case, x C(y)nC(x) y. 
We prove that there exists no x 2 K such that jC(x)j > h^ by a mathe-
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matical induction.
Induction Base: CN =2 K.
Proof of Induction Base. Suppose that CN 2 K. Fix an arbitrary i 2 N .
By n > h^, (D;C i) fig CN . Then, there exists some y 2 X such that
y  (D;C i) by the external stability of K. By Claim 1 and C(y) ( N ,
either CN  y or y  CN . This contradicts the internal stability of K.
Hence, CN =2 K.
Induction Step n  ` + 1 (` > h^): Let ` > h^. Assume that x0 =2 K for all
x0 2 X with jC(x0)j > `. Then, x =2 K for all x 2 X with jC(x)j = `.
Proof of Induction Step `. Let ` > h^. Suppose that there exists some
x 2 K with jC(x)j = `. By jC(x)j > h^, (D; x i) fig x for all i 2 S. Fix
an arbitrary j 2 S. By the internal stability of K, (D; x j) =2 K. By the
external stability of K, there exists some y 2 K such that y  (D; x j). By
the induction hypothesis, jC(y)j  `. By Claim 1 and the internal stability
of K, C(y) n C(x) 6= ;. Thus, C(y) n (C(x) n fjg) 6= ; and (D; x j) !Q y
implies C(y) n (C(x) n fjg)  Q. By ` > h^, ui(y) = f(C; jC(y)j   1) 
f(C; `   1) < f(D; `   1) = ui(D; x j) for all i 2 C(y) n (C(x) n fjg). This
contradicts y  (D; x j). Hence, x =2 K for all x 2 X with jC(x)j = `. 
Thus, K  fx 2 Xj jC(x)j  h^g. Then, x  CN is false for all x 2 K
by h^ < h. This contradicts the external stability of K. Hence no stable set
exists. 
Note that the stable set never exists in the prisoners' dilemma case where
h^ = 0 < h.
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5 The social conict system with delegations
We derive another system from the social conict game by incorporating an
agent and allowing the players to delegate their decisions to the agent. We
give a formal denition rst.
Let   be a social conict game. Dene
X =
[
SN
 fSg  fCS; DSg XNnS :
Dene the dominance relation  on X as follows. Let (S; x); (T; y) 2
X and Q 2 N . We say (T; y) is inducible from (S; x) via Q, denoted by
(S; x)!Q (T; y), i either the following D1 or D2 is satised.
D1 S  T  Q and xNnQ = yNnQ;
D2 S = T , Q \ S = ;, and xNnQ = yNnQ.
We simply say (T; y) is inducible from (S; x), denoted by (S; x) ! (T; y),
i (S; x) !Q (T; y) for some Q 2 N . We say (T; y) dominates (S; x) via
Q, denoted by (T; y) Q (S; x) i (S; x) !Q (T; y) and ui(x) > ui(y) for all
i 2 Q. We simply say (T; y) dominates (S; x), denoted by (T; y)  (S; x) i
(T; y) Q (S; x) for some Q 2 N . We say (X;) is a social conict system
with delegations (derived from the social conict game  ).
In the social conict system with delegations, a responsible agent is pre-
pared. Given (S; x) 2 X, S denotes the set of players who have delegated
their decisions to the agent. Therefore, the agent has the right to change
the strategies of S at (S; x). The agent behaves on behalf of all delegating
players. More formally, the agent changes the strategies when it benets all
the delegating players.
This system also describes an open negotiation. Given a strategy prole,
a coalition of players, which may include the agent, openly declare that it
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will change its strategies if the others stick to the current strategies. This
declaration can involve some players newly delegating their decisions to the
agent, and the agent accept the delegations when the agent is in the coalition
(D1). Of course, no additional delegation occurs when the the agent is not
in the coalition (D2). For simplicity, the agent is assumed to choose identical
strategies for all delegating players.
We also assume that delegation is irreversible. An imaginary situation
is that each player leaves the negotiation after he delegates his decision.
Therefore, a player cannot withdraw his delegation. With this irreversibility,
we emphasize that players are never forced to delegate their decisions to the
agent.
The strong equilibrium can be extended to the case in the social conict
system with delegations (X;): (S; x) 2 X is a strong equilibrium (in
(X;)) i there exists no (T; y) 2 X such that (T; y)  (S; x). In
contrast with the model without delegations, there is a strong equilibrium
in the social conict system with delegations even if h^ < h. For example,
(N;CN) is always a strong equilibrium by Assumption 1(c) (Lemma 4 below).
On the other hand, (;; x) where x is ecient is not a strong equilibrium when
h^ < h. In this case, any player taking C at x can be made better o by
changing his strategy from C to D. In the following theorem, we show the
unique existence and the eciency of the stable set in the social conict
system with delegations. It is also shown that some ecient outcomes where
no delegation takes place are also included in the stable set.
Theorem 1 In the social conict system with delegations (X;),
K = f(S; x) 2 Xj jC(x)j = hg [ f(S; x) 2 Xj C(x) = S; jSj > hg
is the unique stable set. Note that x is ecient for all (S; x) 2 K.
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Before starting the proof of Theorem 1, we prove two lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let (S; x); (T; y) 2 X such that x is ecient. If (T; y)  (S; x),
then C(y)  C(x).
Proof. Let (S; x); (T; y) 2 X such that x is ecient. Assume (T; y) 
(S; x). Suppose that C(y) n C(x) 6= ;. Let z 2 X such that C(z) = C(x) [
C(y) and Q = fi 2 N jxi 6= yig. We have jC(z)j > jC(x)j and Q  C(z). By
(T; y)  (S; x), ui(y) > ui(x) for all i 2 Q. Thus, ui(z) = f(C; jC(z)j 1) 
f(C; jC(y)j   1) = ui(y) > ui(x) for all i 2 Q. For all i =2 Q, ui(z) > ui(x)
by Assumption 1(a) and jC(z)j > jC(x)j. This contradicts the eciency of
x. Hence, C(y) n C(x) = ;. 
Lemma 3 (N;CN) N (S; x) for all S  N and inecient x 2 X.
Proof. Let (S; x) 2 X where x is inecient. By Lemma 1(c), jC(x)j < h.
Obviously, (S; x) !N (N;CN). By the denition of h, ui(CN) = f(C; n  
1) > f(D; jC(x)j) = ui(x) for all i 2 N n C(x). By Assumption 1(a),
ui(CN) = f(C; n   1) > f(C; jC(x)j   1) = ui(x) for all i 2 C(x). Hence,
(N;CN) N (S; x). 
Lemma 4 (N;CN) is a strong equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that (N;CN) is not a strong equilibrium. Then, there
exist some Q 2 N and (S; z) 2 X such that (S; z) Q (N;CN). By the
denition of !Q, S = Q = N . By the denition of X, (N; z) 2 X implies
z 2 fCN ; DNg. Then, (N; z) N (N;CN) is impossible by Assumption 1(c),
a contradiction. Hence, (N;CN) is a strong equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let (X;) be a social conict system with dele-
gations. The internal stability of K follows from Lemma 2.
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We show the external stability. Fix an arbitrary (S; x) 2 X nK. If x
is not ecient, then (N;CN)  (S; x) by Lemma 3, where (N;CN) 2 K.
Therefore, assume that x is ecient. By (S; x) =2 K, the eciency of x, and
Lemma 1(c), jC(x)j > h and C(x) 6= S. Let x 2 X such that (i) C(x) = S
if jSj > h and S  C(x), (ii) jC(x)j = h and S  C(x)  C(x) if jSj  h
and S  C(x), and (iii) jC(x)j = h and C(x)  C(x) if C(x)  N n S. In
any case, C(x)  C(x) and C(x) n C(x)  N n S. Thus, (S; x)!C(x)nC(x)
(S; x). In any case of (i)-(iii), (S; x) 2 K and jC(x)j  h. Then,
ui(x
) = f(D; jC(x)j) > f(C; n   1)  f(C; jC(x)j   1) = ui(x) for all
i 2 C(x) n C(x). Thus, (S; x) C(x)nC(x) (S; x). Hence, K is externally
stable.
We show the uniqueness. Let K  X be a stable set for (X;). By
Lemma 4, (N;CN) 2 K. By (N;CN) 2 K, Lemma 3, and the internal
stability of K, (S; x) =2 K for all (S; x) 2 X with Pareto inecient x. Thus,
K  f(S; x) 2 Xj jC(x)j  hg. By Lemma 2, for any (S; x) 2 K, there
exists no (T; y) 2 K such that (T; y)  (S; x). Thus, K  K by the
external stability of K. Then, K = K follows from the internal stability of
K and the external stability of K.
The eciency immediately follows from Lemma 1(c). 
In the social conict system (without delegation), the stable set consists
of the strong equilibria if it exists (Proposition 1). Now, we turn to the
problem of the stable set coinciding with the set of strong equilibria in the
social conict system with delegations. We show that h^ = h, the same
condition as Proposition 1, is a necessary and sucient condition for the
coincidence of the stable set and the set of strong equilibria.
Proposition 2 Let K be the stable set for the social conict system with
delegations (X;) dened in Theorem 1. Then, K coincides with the set
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of strong equilibria in (X;) if and only if h^ = h.
Proof. Let K be the stable set dened in Theorem 1 and Z be the set of
strong equilibria in (X;). It is straightforward that Z  K from the
external stability of K independent of the relationship between h^ and h^.
Therefore, it suces to show that K  Z if and only if h^ = h.
Assume that h^ = h. Fix an arbitrary (S; x) 2 K. We distinguish
the proof in two cases. The rst case is jC(x)j > h. Then, C(x) = S.
Suppose that there exists some (T; y) 2 X such that (T; y)  (S; x). By the
eciency of x, Lemma 2, and the denition of !, y = DN . By h^ = h and
Assumption 1(c), h^ > 0. Then, ui(DN) = f(D; 0) < f(C; 0)  f(C; jC(x)j  
1) = ui(x) for all i 2 S. This contradicts (T; y)  (S; x) and yi 6= xi for all
i 2 S. Hence, (S; x) is a strong equilibrium.
The second case is jC(x)j = h. By the denitions of ! and !, for all
(S; x); (T; y) 2 X, (S; x) ! (T; y) implies x ! y. Thus, it follows that
(S; x) is a strong equilibrium from Lemma 1(a) and (b). Hence, K  Z.
Then, assume that h^ < h. Let x0 2 X be such that jC(x0)j = h.
We have (;; x0) 2 K. Fix an arbitrary j 2 C(x0). By h^ < h, uj(x0) =
f(C; jC(x0)j   1) < f(D; jC(x0)j   1) = uj(D; x0 j). By the denition of !,
(;; x0) !fjg (;; (x0 j; D)). Thus, (;;D; x0 j) fjg (;; x0), and (;; x0) is not a
strong equilibrium. Hence, K n Z 6= ;. 
6 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the stable sets in two systems derived from a social conict
game. We show that the stable set uniquely exists and consists of certain
ecient outcomes in the social conict system with delegations, while the
stable set fails to exist in the social conict system (without delegations)
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when the Nash equilibrium is inecient. Note that the stable set contains
an ecient outcome without any delegation. We also characterize the stable
sets by strong equilibria. We conclude with two remarks.
First, the agent and the possibility of delegations are exogenously ar-
ranged institutions. We may consider the possibility of endogenously ar-
ranged institutions as in Okada (1993) and investigate the stable set for such
models. Second, the irreversibility of the delegations plays an important role.
A similar analysis was given by Hirai (2012), in which payo transfers are
allowed and full cooperation is achieved. We may also consider what kinds
of institutions lead to full cooperation without payo transfers.
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